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Abstract 
 
The conjuncture that ushered in the era of shareholder value served to embed capital 
market expectations into corporate governance aligning management and shareholder 
interests.  Market arbitrage focussed on modifying contractual relations with 
stakeholders to extract a (higher) return on invested capital. In this article we focus on 
cash earnings on capital employed generated by the S&P 500 survivor group of firms 
covering the period 1990-2008. We use this financial data to construct three 
complementary perspectives on corporate financial performance: firm, firm-relative 
and macro. Within this framework the financial numbers and perspectives are 
analogous to a ‘hall of mirrors’ where ambiguity and contradiction are in play 
frustrating the construction of straightforward narratives about strategic purpose and 
financial outcome.  Rather than abandon the approach we argue it has technical merit 
because it provides the basis to construct alternative critical narrative(s) that explore 
the limits to strategic purpose and corporate financial transformation in an era of 
shareholder value. 
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Corporate strategy financialized: 
       Conjuncture, arbitrage and earnings capacity in the S&P500 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
From being a sporadic trait, of doubtful legitimacy, in the old days of the 
"natural" and "money" economy, the rate of profits or earnings on investment 
has in the nineteenth century come to take the central and dominant place in 
the economic system. Capitalization, credit extensions, and even the 
productiveness and legitimacy of any given employment of labor, are referred 
to the rate of earnings as their final test and substantial ground. (Thorstein 
Veblen, 1904:47) 
 
The primary goal of the corporate managers of such companies was to 
maximize the value of their common stock. Veblen put corporation finance as 
the centerpiece of his analysis of large, acquisition-minded companies. In 
Veblen's analysis, the corporate finance structure was capitalized on the 
earnings capacity of the corporation as a going concern (cited in Ganly, 2004). 
 
 
In Business Enterprise 1904 Veblen is concerned with owner-managers quest to 
increase the rate of ‘profits or earnings on investment’ or as Ganley (2004) observes 
corporate earnings capacity which provides the platform for stock market valuation, 
and thus wealth accumulation for stockholders. Veblen observes that in the modern 
corporation a complex network of business relations are managed where contractual 
negotiation and shrewd manipulation are at the centre of things. This position on the 
firm as a network of contracts up for continual re-negotiation contrasts with Coase 
(1937), whose objective was to understand why there are firms. That is, under what 
circumstances do firms establish contracts and consolidate financial transactions that, 
might otherwise, have been executed by a market mechanism. Veblen’s observation 
about how owner-managers manipulate contracts with stakeholders for the purpose of 
boosting earnings capacity and wealth accumulation for owner-managers is insightful 
and informs the structuring of this paper.    
 
Jensen et al (1976), in a later period, was concerned with the gap that operated 
between what managers were doing with corporate excess cash resources and the 
demands of investors for maximum return on capital employed. Jensen’s argument 
was that debt finance, with its contractual obligation to pay interest, would force 
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managers either to invest in positive Net Present Value (NPV) investment projects or 
distribute the free cash back to shareholders. The conjuncture that ushered in the era 
of shareholder value during the past two decades progressively aligned managerial 
and shareholder interest closing the principal-agent gap identified by Jensen 
(Rappaport, 1986, Stern Stuart, 2002).  A critical literature identifies contradictory 
outcomes, for example, suggesting that the era of shareholder value encouraged a 
policy of “downsize and distribute” by US firms that undermined competitiveness 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, Lazonick, 2008). Froud et al (2006) emphasise the 
discrepancy between managerial narratives and financial numbers where 
transformation, in a world where strategy is financialized, is often disappointing. 
 
This paper builds on the approach taken by Froud et al where financial numbers are 
deployed to construct alternative critically engaged narratives. Our ‘financial 
numbers’ framework of analysis is grounded in accounting to make ‘visible’ earnings 
capacity (cash return on capital employed) and our approach takes the form of series 
of perspectives on financial performance: firm, firm-relative and macro using the S&P 
500 survivor group1 of firms. Froud et al observe that ‘company narratives exist in a 
context that often includes industry narratives and grand narratives of macro-
economic trajectory’ recommending that analysis ‘needs to distinguish different 
micro-, meso-and macro narratives whose interrelation can involve contest and 
challenge as much as support and confirmation’ (Froud et al, 2006:126). Our financial 
framework of analysis in this paper reveals contradiction and ambiguity within and 
across firm, firm-relative and macro boundaries of analysis which, we argue, like 
Froud et al, can support the construction of critical narratives that engage with a 
tendency to exaggerate corporate purpose and financial outcome(s) in an era of 
shareholder value.      
 
Our micro-level financial accounts reveal how a firm’s earnings capacity is the 
product of complex and often contradictory market arbitrage interventions within a 
network of stakeholders. Where, one firm’s relative performance is as affected by the 
strategic actions taken by other firms as much as those taken (or not) by the individual 
firm. Whilst a macro perspective reveals the extent to which S&P 500 survivors have 
                                               
1 S&P 500 firms listed continuously in the S&P 500 composite index 1990 to 2008 
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transformed both the level and trajectory of earnings capacity. All three perspectives 
are, we argue, necessary because they collectively reveal the extent to which earnings 
capacity has been transformed and form the basis upon which alternative critical 
narratives can be constructed.     
 
 
2.  Corporate strategy financialized. 
 
In this section we conceptualise corporate strategy financialized using three 
organizing elements: first the notion of conjunctural break where managerial and 
shareholder interests align in an era of shareholder value, second market arbitrage to 
describe how managers (as agents) exploit disturbances between and within markets 
to modify stakeholder contracts, and third a financial framework to reveal firm, firm-
relative and macro perspectives on earnings capacity. Our purpose is to employ the 
financial numbers and perspectives on financial performance to construct alternative 
critical narratives about financial transformation in the S&P 500.     
 
2.1 Conjunctural break: aligning managerial and investor interests 
 
In Veblen’s text on Business Enterprise owner-managers are at the centre of things in 
terms of understanding how corporate finance and physical resources can be deployed 
to increase earnings capacity and market capitalization for investors. In a later period, 
Chandler observes that family owner-managers became increasingly decoupled from 
the strategic and day to day management of the American corporation.  
Owners continued to participate as full-time executives in decisions 
establishing top-level policy and resource allocation. But in making even these 
decisions the family members worked closely with full-time salaried top-and 
middle-level managers who had little or no equity in the enterprise”  (Chandler, 
1990:48) 
 
Consider the specific case of General Motors whose stockholders increased from 
1,900 (1917) to 343,000 (1936) where over eighty percent of these stockholders held 
less than 50 shares each (GM Archive, US).  Hannah (2007) reveals the extent of the 
separation of ownership and control in the US but is more cautious about using capital 
market modernity as an explanation for US superior economic performance.  
 
5 
 
Slowly, but surely, America’s leading industrial firms did list on New York: 
Carnegie Steel (reborn as the core of US Steel) in 1901, Standard Oil in 1920, 
Procter & Gamble in 1929, Gulf Oil in 1943, Alcoa in 1951. Shareholdings in 
listed firms also became more dispersed, as directing families trickled out their 
stocks to the public. Berle and Means really could, by the 1930s, celebrate 
America’s having caught up with Britain and overtaken continental Europe in 
the divorce of ownership from control: by then, in the typical American 
quoted company, the managers owned only 13 per cent of the equity, a figure 
identical to my crude London estimate for 1900. (Hannah, 2007: 36) 
 
Arising out of the separation of ownership from control is the argument that managers, 
as agents might deliver less than the maximum earnings on investor’s capital when 
interests of managers and investors diverge. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are 
concerned that corporate resources would find their way into investment projects that 
delivered less than an optimal return for the shareholder-investor.  Jensen (1986) 
introduces the concept of free cash flow to reveal agency cost as resulting from 
managers investing in negative Net Present Value (NPV) projects.  To limit this 
behaviour Jensen agues that debt finance, with its contractual requirement to return 
interest and principal sum to the investor, would act as a disciplinary instrument 
forcing managers to ensure that returns on investment exceeded the cost of capital.  
 
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies 
are especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash 
flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather 
than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational 
inefficiencies (Jensen 1986: 230)  
 
A more recent literature on the financialization of strategy (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000, Froud et al 2006, Millberg, 2008, Millberg and Winkler, 2009) emphasises how 
the interests of managers and shareholders align. Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s 
contribution to the debate on financialization and corporate governance is their 
account of how households have delegated management and trading of corporate 
equity to investment banks on their behalf. According to Froud et al (2002), this form 
of coupon pool capitalism (share capital concentrated and managed by investment 
banks and insurance companies) also becomes an institutional regulator of firm 
behaviour through corporate governance where managerial remuneration is tied to 
financial performance. In the US throughout the post-war period, households directly 
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manage a smaller proportion of corporate equities with financial institutions steadily 
increasing their share of domestic corporate equities (see chart 1)   
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of funds tables (Z1) table L213, various years 
 
The conjuncture ushering in an era of shareholder value increases the pressure on 
managers to extract a higher return on capital invested, for example, modifying the 
alchemy of business models to boost shareholder value and increase the probability of 
a higher stock market valuation and wealth accumulation for shareholders (Feng et al, 
2001). Millberg (2008) argues that US firms recalibrated their global organisation of 
production through out-sourcing and off-shoring to extract additional cash from 
operations. This additional cash resource distributed as dividends, share buy-backs 
and cash acquisitions to shareholders (Andersson et al, 2007 and Lazonick, 2008) 
where the demands of financial institutions that manage share capital becomes 
incorporated into corporate governance structures and incentives driving managerial 
remuneration and bonus contracts (Andersson, 2009). Many senior executives have 
remuneration packages that stress meeting certain financial targets such as: earnings 
per share (EPS), cash and profit return on assets / capital employed, and Economic 
Value Added (EVA™) relative to a selected peer group or industry sector. All of 
these performance metrics combine earnings (as profit or cash) and a measure of 
capital employed where the general objective is to boost earnings capacity (profit or 
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cash generated per financial unit of capital employed) relative to other firms in a 
competition of all against all.  
 
2.2  Arbitraging markets for financial gain. 
 
Coase’s (1937) seminal paper on transactions costs is concerned with why there are 
firms and observes that firms exist and survive where the cost of organizing 
transactions within the firm are lower than the costs of organising in another firm or 
leaving transactions to be organised by the market (Coase, 1937:14). The transaction 
cost itself, according to Coase (1960), is connected with the need to: 
 
 …discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make 
sure that the terms of the contract are being observed (Coase, 1960:15). 
 
Williamson (1975, 1981), Williamson and Winter (1993) explain how alternative 
forms of organisation structure arise where the objective is to reduce the cost of 
negotiation and enforcement embodied in the organisation and expense of transacting. 
Difficulties arise, however, when trying to identify transaction costs in financial 
statements and reconciling the variety of theoretical approaches employed to explain 
why transactions congeal into organisations rather than left to the market. 
 
Rather than try to identify transaction costs and justify why there are firms and how 
transaction costs can lead to the development of particular forms of organisation we 
are interested in the issues of negotiation, bargain and resultant contract. Veblen 
(1904), observed how the development of modern corporation finance resulted in a 
more complex network of business relations where contractual negotiation and 
shrewd manipulation are important. And that this mediation is through pecuniary 
transactions carried out for business ends rather than from simply a narrow efficiency 
of industry perspective. Veblen’s observations on pecuniary negotiation separates the 
businessman from the rest of society because they are able to exert discretion and 
position to exploit change and disturbances in and across markets to (possibly) boost 
earnings capacity and increase the probability of wealth accumulation for owner-
managers.               
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In proportion as the machine industry gained ground, and as the modern 
concatenation of industrial processes and of markets developed, the 
conjunctures of business grew more varied and of larger scope at the same 
time that they became more amenable to shrewd manipulation.....  
 
The adjustments of industry take place through the mediation of pecuniary 
transactions, and these transactions take place at the hands of the business men 
and are carried on by them for business ends, not for industrial ends in the 
narrower meaning of the phrase. (Veblen 1904:17-18) 
 
 
In this article we take the position that managers (as agents) deploy corporate 
resources to modify the firm’s networks to ‘arbitrage’ stakeholder contracts that are 
located in various markets. The Oxford Pocket Dictionary describes arbitrage as the 
‘simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in different 
markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices’. This 
definition drifts towards a narrow financial markets perspective where the traffic of 
transactions is predominantly located in specific markets where relatively 
standardised contracts are traded, for example, currencies or securities. In a narrow 
financial markets use the term arbitrage describes the exploitation of price 
differentials to earn a profit margin after commission fees. In this article we employ 
the term market arbitrage to describe how negotiations modify contracts with 
corporate stakeholders across and within markets to establish permanent or temporary 
control over resources.  Managers, arbitrage markets to exploit physical, financial and 
temporal asymmetries where these differences offer the possibility of financial 
leverage and a boost to earnings capacity for corporate shareholders.  
 
2.3  Revealing financial performance and earnings capacity.  
 
In this section, we construct a financial model of the firm that reveals earnings 
capacity as a variable outcome of arbitrage within and across markets. Constructing 
this financial model is not itself straightforward because transactions recorded in the 
financial statements of publicly quoted firms generally use the ‘function’ rather than 
‘nature’ of the expense format to present income statements. Expenses classified by 
function include marketing, selling and distribution, research and development, which 
are subject to managerial judgement concerning the allocation of expenses and do not 
align with ‘markets’. Whereas, expenses classified by their nature more closely align 
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with market-derived costs such as materials and procurement purchases, labour costs 
and charges associated with capital employed. This alternative format of presenting 
financial statements using the nature of expenses approach is generally not employed 
by North American firms although more common in Europe (Baker et al 2005). The 
intention, in recent drafts of International Accounting Standards 1 (IASB, 2003: 1), is 
to encourage firms to also disclose expenses by nature if they have already presented 
disclosed expenses by function in their presentation of financial statements.     
 
The nature of expenses approach also aligns with national and sector traditions of 
national accounting where estimates as to the value of net output of an industry sector 
or national economy are required. Cox (1979) reveals how the national accounts 
employ a nature of expenses format to calculate value added which measures the net 
output of a firm after deducting external expenses thereby avoiding double counting 
income and expenses relating to the activities of other firms. The nature of expense 
value added calculative formula facilitates the aggregation of firm financials into 
sector and national aggregates and, significantly, reference group(s) against which the 
individual firm’s financial performance can be calibrated. In the early 1970´s value 
added accounting gained popularity within accounting in most European countries as 
the focus shifted from how to measure income to whose income to measure as a result 
of the shift in the political landscape. Interest in the concept of value added has faded 
since the publication of the Corporate Report in UK 1975 (ASSC 1975) which 
suggested the presentation structure of a value added statement (value retention). To 
construct a computation of value retention eight financial elements are required: 
 
- Net revenue (R),  
- Bought-in-materials and services (IC),  
- Salaries and wages including benefits (W),  
- Dividends paid (Div),  
- Net interest paid (I),  
- Taxation (T),  
- Depreciation of fixed assets (Depr)  
- Retained earnings (R). 
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These elements are arranged to calculate value retention; 
 
                       Subtractively as: 
     
VR = R – IC                                 (1) 
 
                      Additively as:       
 
      VR = W + Depr + T + I + Div + R                 (2) 
 
In practice, value retention is calculated using equation 2 and bought-in-material and 
services (IC) calculated as residual when sales revenues (R) and value retention (VR) 
are known in equation 1, as bought-in-material is not normally published by public 
quoted firms.  The value retention computation in equation (2) is computed additively 
as the summation of its distributed elements. The residual after deducting wages and 
salaries (W) describes cash from operations or the more popular Earnings before 
Interest Tax and Depreciation (EBITDA). EBITDA revealing how much cash is 
generated from operating activities conducted by the firm and is a key element in 
shareholder value metrics. 
 
Cash from operations (EBITDA) is calculated; 
 
Subtractively as: 
  VR – W = (EBITDA)                     (3) 
Additively as:       
  EBITDA = Depr + T + I + Div + R       (4) 
 
To complete a financial model that describes a firm’s earnings capacity it is necessary 
to introduce a measure of the stock of capital employed which is a summation of 
interest demanding capital, normally debt and shareholder equity taken from the 
balance sheet. This earnings capacity (the cash return on capital employed) shown in 
equation (5) as cash return on capital employed (Cash ROCE): 
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This approach of formatting a financial model the firm’s earnings capacity for value 
creation has the advantage of revealing stakeholder expenses arising from intervention 
is various ‘markets’ and their deduction from sales revenue.  Identifying the share of 
external procurements in sales revenue, value retention and its distribution to 
employees (labour market), and dividends and net interest paid (capital market).  
Deducting labour costs from value retained reveals the cash generated from 
operations (EBITDA) and this can be set against the stock of capital employed (as 
debt and equity funds) for both value creation and value absorption for shareholders 
(Andersson et al, 2008a). We can aggregate financial information for a group of firms 
(the reference group) to calibrate one firm’s relative financial performance against the 
others or present aggregate averages. In the following section we construct three 
analytical perspectives to account for the transformation in earnings capacity of S&P 
500 survivor firms during the period 1990 to 2008. 
 
3.  Accounting for transformation in the S&P 500 1990-2008.  
 
In this section we construct a series of perspectives to account for the transformation 
in earnings capacity in the S&P 500 survivor group. We start at the firm level and 
deconstruct earnings capacity before turning to construct a firm-relative and macro 
aggregate account of changes in cash return on capital employed in the S&P500. All 
three perspectives are necessary to construct a critical account that explores the extent 
of financial transformation (earnings capacity) in the S&P 500 survivor group.  
 
1. Firm level financial performance 
 
We start by constructing a hypothetical example to reveal a spectrum of possible 
earnings capacity outcome(s) and these are shown in table 1. In this table a movement 
left to right involves our hypothetical firm generating additional cash from operations 
out of income after deducing the external costs of materials and supplies and internal 
labour expense. Incorporating capital employed into this table enables us to calculate 
                Sales – (Intermediate inputs + internal labour costs)                     (5) 
                               Long-term debt + Shareholder equity 
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earnings capacity, that is, cash generated per financial unit of capital employed (Cash 
ROCE). Movements left to right in table 1 reveal that, after adjusting for capital 
intensity, earnings capacity (return on capital employed) increases from 5 to 45 per 
cent. Out-sourcing and off-shoring, for example, offer the potential to boost earnings 
capacity (OECD,2007) where organisational unbundling (Jacobides, 2003) 
reconfigures the mix of activities undertaken by the firm and where internal cost 
reduction is not offset by increased external input costs and balance sheet 
capitalization. Gereffi (1994) shows how leading brand companies sought to re-
structure their global value chains and the implications this has for governance, 
technical transfer, division of competences and (Sturgeon 1997, Lee and Chen 2000) 
how power within global markets utilised to extract higher returns (Kaplan and 
Kaplinsky 1998).  
 
Table 1 
 
Firm financial operating ratios and earnings capacity 
 
FIRM  At0 At1 At2 At3 At4 
Sales revenue 100 100 100 100 100 
Purchases -90 -70 -50 -30 -10 
Value added retained 10 30 50 70 90 
Employee expenses -9 -21 -25 -21 -9 
Cash retained 1 9 25 49 81 
Capital employed % sales 
revenue – capital intensity 20 60 100 140 180 
Cash ROCE % 5 15 25 35 45 
 
Source: Authors  
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Table 2: 
Changes in earnings capacity: some illustrative cases 
 
  Hershey 
Johnson and 
Johnson 
Eastman 
Kodak 
Bank of 
America 
  1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 
Sales  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Purchases (71) (69) (50) (47) (47) (71) 72 64 
Value retained 29 31 50 53 53 29 28 36 
Labour costs (14) (12) (29) (23) (31) (23) 12.6 16.2 
Cash (EBITDA) 15 19 21 30 22 6 15.4 19.8 
Capital intensity  0.55 0.35 0.55 0.8 0.72 0.23 0.5 1.5 
Cash ROCE 27.3 54.3 38.2 37.5 30.6 26.1 31.0 13.3 
 
Sources: SEC Edgar database 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml 
Notes: Financial information converted into a percentage of total sales revenue. Capital intensity is 
capital employed (long-term debt plus equity) as percent of total sales. Value retained is sales revenue 
minus purchases. Cash is value added retained minus labour costs. The Capital to intensity index is 
sales revenue divided into capital employed (long-term debt plus shareholder equity). The cash ROCE 
found by dividing cash share of sales by the capital intensity index.  For Bank of America revenues are 
interest income plus non-interest income. Purchases are interest expenses and all other external charges 
for services provided. Capital intensity index is net revenues divided into shareholder equity. 
 
In table 2 we have extracted financials for: Hershey, Johnson and Johnson, Eastman 
Kodak and Bank of America where the purpose is to illustrate how key financial 
operating ratios can change over a period of time to increase or reduce earnings 
capacity (cash return on capital employed). Hershey a consumer discretionary 
manufacturer of chocolate products had reduced external purchase costs 
(predominantly cocoa) from 71 to 61 percent by 2005 but a significant increase in the 
price of cocoa per pound weight (from 69 cents to $1.19 and a high of $1.50 in 2008) 
increased purchase costs out of revenue back to 69 percent. Overall, a reduction in the 
share of purchase costs and labour costs in sales revenue served to boost cash earnings 
in sales from 15 to 19 percent. This favourable performance, in combination with a 
significant reduction in capital intensity (long-term debt plus shareholder equity in 
sales) helped to double cash earnings capacity from 27 to 54 percent. Hershey had 
deployed roughly half of its cash from operations (1990 to 2008) to repurchase $4bn 
of issued share capital at an average market price of $35 per share. This accumulated 
treasury stock amounted is accounted for (in the balance sheet) as a deduction from 
shareholder equity. This had the effect of lowering reported shareholder equity to 
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$300 million, reducing capital employed and boosting earnings capacity (Cash 
ROCE).  
 
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) has expanded overseas manufacturing capacity during the 
last few decades. During the period, 1988 to 1999 non-US manufacturing capacity 
increased by 20% and in the following period (1999 to 2007) the cumulative increase 
was significantly higher at 40%. This shift to overseas production is coincident with a 
reduction in external costs as a share of sales from 50 to 47 percent. In addition, the 
switch into overseas markets for production may also have contributed to a reduction 
in the share of internal labour costs from 29 to 23 percent of sales revenue. The 
combination of lower external and internal labour costs increases the share of cash 
extracted out of sales revenues from 21 to 30 percent. Yet the earnings capacity (cash 
ROCE) for the company remained steady during this period at 38 per cent because 
capital intensity (capital employed per dollar of sales revenue) increased by sixty 
percent offsetting the gains in cash share in sales.  
 
J&J in similar fashion to Hershey has deployed considerable sums of cash to buy-
back shares for treasury stock. Over the period, 1990 to 2007 J&J spent $33.2bn of 
cash resources on capital expenditure and, an equivalent sum $38.5bn, on share buy-
backs.  As at December 31st 2008 the balance on treasury stock was $19bn with 
further $20bn previously allocated to support a stream of acquisitions the most recent 
of which was the purchase of Pfizer’s Consumer Healthcare operations (for $16bn) 
that included products such as Listerine. The majority of these corporate acquisitions 
accounted for using the purchase method following regulations outlined in Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard SFAS 141 ‘Business Combinations’ where the full 
market value (rather than book value of the acquisition) has to be accounted for in the 
acquiring company balance sheet. This had the effect of inflating the J&J’s balance 
sheet ahead of cash earnings and reducing reported cash ROCE (Andersson, 2007). 
The change to ‘mark to market’ accounting resulting from pressure by institutional 
investors. Writing in the CPA magazine in 2006, Shortridge at al observe: 
 
Perhaps the strongest argument for a move to fair-value accounting is that 
historical-cost financial statements do not provide information that is relevant 
to investors.  http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2006/406/essentials/p37.htm 
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Eastman Kodak once dominated the provision of consumer and professional films, 
traditional photofinishing and certain industrial and aerial film market segments but 
these markets have been in steady decline with the advent of digital imaging 
technology. Company sales peaked in 1996 at $16bn but thereafter the company 
having restructured migrated into new business segments, for example digital 
technology and healthcare imaging systems. By 2008, value added retained in the 
company had fallen from 53 percent to 29 percent and employment levels reduced by 
60 per cent to stabilise operating ratios. At the end of this period in 2008 labour costs 
accounted for a very high 80 per cent of value added retained leaving only a small 
cash residual of 5 per cent of sales in 2008. Accumulated losses, asset write downs 
and previously accumulated treasury stock reduced the value of shareholder equity 
from $7bn in 1990 to $960 million and capital intensity from 70 percent of sales 
revenue to 23 percent helping to sustain reported earnings capacity even though the 
company was shrinking.   
 
Bank of America generates net revenues from interest and non-interest income and 
after deducting interest expense and all other external charges for services provided 
net revenue retained in the bank was 28 percent of sales out of which 45% is then 
used to cover employee expenses leaving cash from operations at 15 percent of net 
revenues. By 2008 the share of cash generated out of net revenues had increased to 20 
percent due to a reduction in external costs. However, capital intensity (shareholder 
equity in this case) increased by a factor of three so as to maintain capital adequacy 
ratios in line with the growth in assets (including securitized loans). Bank of Americas 
shareholder equity had increased at a faster rate than cash extracted out of net income 
reducing cash share of equity from 31 to 13 percent and incidentally also reducing the 
margin of safety from loan defaults and charge-offs (Heilpern et al, 2008).  
 
These illustrative firm level cases reveal how arbitrage interventions and contractual 
re-negotiation with stakeholders across markets often do not align to increase earnings 
capacity. The financial framework of analysis permits a deconstruction of earnings 
capacity into its constituent market driven elements (product, procurement, labour and 
capital) to reveal how contradiction and ambiguity play out.  
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3.2 Relative financial performance  
 
The remuneration packages of senior executives are often tied to relative performance 
metrics, for example, Pfizer and Ford Motor connect executive compensation to the 
relative to the performance of a ‘Peer Group’  
 
The (remuneration) Committee continues to believe that total shareholder 
return is the most appropriate measure of relative performance in relation to 
Pfizer’s business objectives and therefore selected relative total shareholder 
return as the sole performance measure for the 2009 PSA cycle. In the 
Committee’s view our relative total shareholder return compared with the 
pharmaceutical peer group remained strategic priority during this period.  
 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/10/9999999997-10-006958 
 
Total Shareholder Returns of Ford Compared with Total Shareholder Returns 
of other S&P 500 Companies. 
 
http://www.ford.com/doc/2009_proxy.pdf 
 
 
In this section, we compare the financial performance of Ford Motor Corporation and 
Pfizer relative to a reference group, that is, all S&P 500 survivors for the period 1998 
to 2008. This reveals not only that there are winners and losers (migration) but also 
that relative performance is influenced not only by actions taken by the individual 
firm but those taken by all other firms in the reference group. For example, in Charts 
2 and 3, we show how the Ford Motor Corporation’s relative position in terms of cash 
extracted from sales and cash return on capital deteriorates during the period 1998 to 
2008. From a position where 79 per cent of S&P 500 survivor firms were below Ford 
to one where 47 per cent are below in 2008. 
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Source: Raw data from Edgar SEC dataset, 10-K’s and ThomsonOneBanker 
Note: Ford Motor Corporation  positioned relative to all other firms in the S&P 500 survivor group. 
Figures show the percentage of S&P 500 survivor firms that are positioned below Ford. 
   
Source: Raw data from Edgar SEC dataset, 10-K’s and ThomsonOneBanker 
Note: Pfizer  positioned relative to all other firms in the S&P 500 survivor group. Figures show the 
percentage of S&P 500 survivor firms that are positioned below Pfizer. 
 
 
In contrast to Ford Motor, Pfizer improved its relative position in terms of cash 
extracted from sales revenue moving from a position where it is in the top 20 percent 
to the top 10 percent of S&P 500 survivors. However, Pfizer’s relative Cash ROCE 
position deteriorates after 2003 when the acquisition of Pharmacia Upjohn (accounted 
for at fair value) inflated balance sheet capital employed ahead of cash earnings 
taking it from the top 10 per cent to top 30 per cent of S&P 500 survivors.  
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We have argued that, at the level of the firm, market arbitrage interventions and re-
negotiated stakeholder contracts do not straightforwardly translate into higher level of 
cash earnings on capital employed because stakeholder networks and contractual 
relations are complex and contradictory outcomes possible. In this section we 
introduced the additional dimension of ‘relative’ financial performance to reveal 
winners and losers. Moreover, once we introduce the notion of relative performance 
the actions of others firms in the reference group also matter and have influence 
because an individual firm’s relative position may change, for better or worse, due to 
the success (or failure) of other firms. Constructing a profile of both firm level and 
relative corporate financial performance provides insight into the extent to which 
arbitrage in specific markets adjusts firm level financial performance relative to all 
others. Although significant, firm and firm-relative narratives about performance need 
to be supplemented with a macro account because this reveals the extent to which all 
firms have delivered stronger earnings capacity and are on a sustained trajectory.  
 
3.3 Aggregate financial performance in the S&P 500 survivor group 
 
Our aggregate financial analysis reveals the performance of the survivor group of 
firms listed in the S&P 500 from 1990 to 2008.  During the period 1980 to 1990 S&P 
500 survivors increased cash extracted out of total revenue from 15 to 17 percent. 
During the 1990s the increase in the share of cash extracted out of sales revenue is 
more pronounced increasing to 21 percent by the end of the 1990s. Thereafter, the 
share of cash extracted out of total income remains just above 20 percent apart from 
cyclical downturns. For example, the severity of the recession in 2008 is revealed as a 
drop in the share of cash extracted from sales revenue back to levels last seen since 
the early 1990s  
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 Source: Thomson One Banker and SEC Edgar datasets, various years  
 
During 1990 to 1999, the S&P 500 survivor group increased cash extracted out of 
sales revenues but this coincided with an increase in balance sheet capitalization 
(long-term debt plus equity) which increased relative to sales revenue. From 65 cents 
of capital employed per dollar of sales in 1990 to $1.14 of capital employed per dollar 
of sales. Andersson et al (2008b) have argued that this is partially explained by the 
fact that corporate purchases (mergers/acquisitions) were progressively accounted for 
at market value (rather than pooled) during the last decade and a half. 
 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker and SEC Edgar datasets, various years  
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After a brief period during 1990 to 1995 when the cash ROCE reported by the S&P 
500 survivor group increased and then reached a peak of 26 percent it has since fallen 
steadily to a level of 17 percent in 2008.   
 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker and SEC Edgar datasets, various years  
 
Although the US corporate sector has been under pressure to generate additional cash 
out of capital employed for shareholders aggregate earnings capacity (cash earnings 
on capital employed) was not transformed in the S&P 500 survivor group.  
 
4. Discussion / Summary  
 
In this paper we have argued that corporate governance internalized the interests of 
institutional shareholders forcing managers to exploit market arbitrage, re-negotiate 
contractual relations with stakeholders, to boost earnings capacity (cash earnings on 
capital employed). As Veblen observed, managers were executing shrewd contractual 
negotiation and deal making to boost earnings capacity, and increasing the probability 
of wealth accumulation for shareholders.  
 
Our objective in this paper has been to reveal financial performance in the S&P 500 
survivor group employing a financial performance framework of analysis to make 
visible three complementary perspectives or levels of analysis: firm, firm-relative and 
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macro. These three perspectives on financial performance facilitate the construction 
of critical narratives about financial transformation in an era of shareholder value in 
the S&P 500.     
 
At the level of the firm we employ this financial framework to deconstruct bottom 
line earnings capacity to show how interventions across and within specific 
markets/stakeholders are difficult to align because contradictory forces are in play. 
Out-sourcing, off-shoring, and mergers may not deliver increased earnings capacity if, 
for example: higher external costs in income are not offset by a reduction in internal 
labour costs or, the market value of corporate acquisitions inflates balance sheet 
capitalization ahead of cash earnings. Relative performance is also a key ingredient in 
the structuring of incentives aligning managerial and shareholder financial interests. 
In this paper we reveal firm performance against all S&P 500 survivors (the reference 
group) from which we can observe the extent to which migration is positive (Pfizer) 
or negative (Ford). This analysis not only reveals a pattern of winners and losers, but 
also how one firms relative performance changes as much from its own actions as 
those carried out (or not) by others in the reference group. To put relative corporate 
performance into perspective it is also necessary to construct an account of aggregate 
macro financial performance for the S&P survivor group to reveal level and trajectory. 
During the period 1990 to 2008, an era of shareholder value, we find that the S&P 500 
survivor group did not, on average, transform earnings capacity.  
 
Our focus has been with accounting for earnings capacity in the S&P 500 group of 
survivors at a firm, firm-relative and macro level. Within this realm of financial 
numbers and perspectives the analogy is with the hall of mirrors where ambiguity and 
contradiction are in play frustrating straightforward narratives that connect strategic 
purpose to financial outcome.  Rather than abandon this framework of analysis we 
argue that this approach has technical merit because it facilitates the production of 
alternative critical narrative(s). These could, for example, be contrasted with those 
that present a stronger argument supporting a relation between strategic purpose and 
corporate financial transformation in an era of shareholder value. 
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